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Introduction 
The future of the fiscal devolution arrangements in the UK 
has been the subject of intense political debate over the 
last parliament and during the 2001 election campaign. 
It is regrettable, though not entirely surprising, that much of 
the attention in the fiscal devolution debate has fallen on 
the extent to which devolved authorities like Scotland would 
be able to survive on their own in a system of complete 
fiscal autonomy. 
The discussion on Scotland's deficit or surplus is a moot 
point. This is not only because there are widely varying 
estimates of the deficit, depending on assumptions about 
future North Sea tax revenues, but also because Scotland's 
hypothetical surplus or deficit is irrelevant unless it leaves 
the Union. Whilst some federal arrangements allow indi-
vidual regional/state governments to borrow to finance 
fiscal deficits, this freedom is (in most cases) curtailed. It is 
almost impossible to envisage a situation in which devolu-
tion in the UK will evolve to a point where devolved regional 
assemblies or parliaments will have the ability to engage in 
deficit finance. Thus, as we shall discuss below, Scotland's 
putative fiscal deficit or surplus would simply affect the 
extent to which it could make a contribution towards any 
equalisation arrangement which might be put in place to 
allow the UK regions to support each other. We will not, 
therefore, discuss the issue of deficit finance in this paper. 
The key policy issue that we address here is whether the UK 
can continue to live with its current system of fiscal devolu-
tion. There is a reasonably broad agreement that the 
current system to allocate government spending in the UK, 
the so-called 'Barnett formula', will come increasingly under 
fire in the coming years. The reason why it cannot provide a 
long-term basis for the UK's system of fiscal devolution is 
discussed below. 
But pointing out the defects in the current system is easy. A 
more challenging task is finding an alternative. The UK 
could learn from other countries' experiences with systems 
of fiscal federalism/devolution. Indeed, our key conclusions 
are the following: first, a greater degree of fiscal autonomy 
would be desirable in the devolved authorities in the UK. 
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Second, if the devolved author i t ies are to be given addi-
t ional powers to raise taxes, it is likely tha t personal income 
taxat ion is t he most promis ing form of devolved taxat ion. 
The 'Barnett Formula' 
Currently, the spend ing budgets of Scot land, Wales and 
Northern Ireland are determined accord ing to the so-called 
'Barnet t fo rmula ' , a system devised in 1 9 7 8 , and named 
af ter the then Chief Secretary to the Treasury Joel (now 
Lord) Barnet t MP. 
Historically government spend ing per capi ta in Scot land has 
been higher than in England: in 1 9 9 8 - 9 9 , Scott ish spending 
per head was 24 per cent higher than in England. Scot-
land's spend ing per head even exceeds tha t of less wealthy 
nor thern English regions. Over t ime, these dispar i t ies wil l 
d isappear, t hanks to t he work ings of t he formula (the so-
cal led 'Barnet t squeeze') which will cause spending per 
head to converge to English levels. How quickly tha t 
happens depends on a number of factors, but in 15-16 
years spend ing per capita in Scot land wil l be jus t 10% 
above English per capi ta levels, given current macroeco-
nomic t rends. 
It should be s t ressed, however, tha t unt i l recently the 
'Barnet t squeeze' has not operated as envisaged by the 
formula . In the late 1970s , per capita spend ing in Scot land 
was about 2 2 % higher than in England, so the s i tuat ion has 
not deter iorated. The reason for th is is twofo ld : f i rst , 
because the Barnet t formula was not adjusted to take 
account of Scot land 's populat ion, which decl ined between 
1976-88 . However, the intent ion is tha t t he formula wil l be 
adjusted to take account of populat ion changes, so tha t the 
'Barnet t squeeze' should take ef fect f rom now onwards. 
Another way in which the Barnet t a l locat ion can be by-
passed is if the UK government makes decis ions which lead 
to addi t ional costs for the Scott ish par l iament (e.g. deci-
s ions on NHS pay which apply th roughout the UK), or the 
UK government makes a general ad jus tment to public 
expenditure programmes which it wishes to see appl ied 
uniformly across t he UK. There have been a number of 
occasions when the formula has been bypassed. If these 
exceptions, which vary f rom year to year, occur wi th a 
cer ta in frequency, then the 'squeeze' would be delayed. 
However, regardless of whether the squeeze wil l operate 
uniformly over the next decade to br ing Scott ish spend ing 
closer in line wi th English spend ing levels, th is system of 
f iscal devolut ion fa i ls on two counts. First, there is no 
inherent logic behind the Barnet t fo rmula , which bears no 
explicit relat ion to the spend ing needs of the devolved 
author i t ies. Second, the current ar rangements involve l i t t le 
f iscal autonomy, and elected regional pol i t ic ians are not 
properly accountab le for their spend ing decis ions. 
The issue of what level of spend ing in Scot land would 
appropriately ref lect 'needs' is d iscussed below. If the 
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'Barnet t squeeze' is al lowed to operate as envisaged, the 
current system of spending al locat ion may come under 
at tack f rom within Scot land. There is no doubt tha t as the 
'squeeze' begins to bite it wil l become more di f f icul t for the 
Scott ish Parl iament to sustain its exist ing spending commit-
ments . English pol i t ic ians will also cont inue to at tack it, 
especially if devolut ion is extended to the English regions. If 
the Labour government mainta ins its promise of consulta-
t ion on English regional devolut ion dur ing its second term 
of of f ice, the issue of relative spending levels in the poorer 
English regions compared to Scotland and Wales wil l be 
under the spot l ight. 
The reason why a system of f iscal devolut ion should involve 
at least some e lement of f iscal autonomy is tha t it ensures 
greater accountabi l i ty. Fiscal autonomy brings together the 
authori ty to spend with the responsibi l i ty of taxat ion, and 
th is helps t o promote f iscal responsibi l i ty amongst local 
pol i t ic ians and electorates. To put th is another way, allow-
ing devolved author i t ies the power to spend wi thout the 
responsibi l i ty to tax involves separat ing the benefi ts f rom 
increased spending from the costs of raising the required 
revenue, which is undesirable. The just i f icat ion for th is 
s ta tement can be found in public f inance theory and can be 
stated as fol lows. If local f iscal expenditures are f inanced 
through lump-sum grants f rom central government, one 
would expect a benevolent local government to al locate 
spending in such a way as to maximise social welfare 
subject to the constra int tha t the entire central government 
grant is spent . However, each local government does not 
have any incentive to consider the opportuni ty cost of 
raising addi t ional taxat ion (i.e. lower private expenditures). 
Hence, in some devolved author i t ies public goods might be 
over-provided for (the marginal benef i t of the public goods 
provided is less than the marginal benef i t of a hypothetical 
tax rebate), and in others there might be under-provision. 
(Unless by some miracle of central planning, central 
government al locat ions ful ly match the opportuni ty costs of 
taxat ion with the marginal benef i ts of addi t ional public 
spending for each local government). This is the sense in 
which f iscal devolut ion wi thout f iscal autonomy makes local 
pol i t ic ians less accountable. 
Fiscal autonomy - a comparison with other 
countries 
As shown in Table 1 , the UK has one of the least decentral-
ised tax systems in the developed world. This is measured 
by the proport ion of sub-national spending f inanced 
through taxes raised locally. Unlike other countr ies, the 
devolved author i t ies in the UK rely a lmost exclusively on 
hand-outs (block grants) f rom central government. 
Admittedly the f igures shown exaggerate the UK's posit ion 
because a number of countr ies use tax-sharing systems. 
Under tax-sharing arrangements central government 
remains in charge of the col lect ion of most of the main 
taxes (personal income tax, corporat ion tax, VAT), but 
regional governments are assigned some proport ion of the 
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revenues collected in their own territory. In countr ies where 
these arrangements are prevalent (e.g. Germany, Spain, 
Norway) regional /state governments do not have the abil i ty 
to alter tax rates or their tax base. Whilst it could be argued 
that tax-sharing does l i tt le to ensure greater accountabi l i ty 
compared to direct government hand-outs, it shows clearly 
how much each region is raising in tax. The cross-
subsidisat ion between regions therefore becomes much 
more t ransparent. It does imply tha t any discussion of 
expenditure decisions at a regional /s tate level is accompa-
nied by a discussion of how regional budgets are deter-
mined. 
To go beyond tax-sharing towards substant ia l f iscal au-
tonomy (as in the USA, Canada, Australia) s tate/ regional 
governments have to be allowed to set their own rates of 
tax. This is not without problems. It would be undesirable, 
given the high mobil i ty of businesses, to give UK regions 
the power to alter corporation taxes. Most smal l countr ies 
avoid regional di f ferent ials in corporate taxes because they 
can lead to distort ions in the location decisions by busi-
nesses, and tax avoidance through transfer pr icing arrange-
ments. There are also major administ rat ive costs in varying 
multi-stage taxes such as VAT at a regional level. E-com-
merce is also progressively eroding the abil i ty to vary value 
added or sales taxes at a regional level, as many US states 
are f ind ing out to their cost. 
If the UK wants to extend the tax-raising power of the 
devolved authori t ies, it should do so through regional 
personal income taxat ion. In Scotland th is would simply 
extend the scope which Holyrood already has to vary the 
rate of income tax. Local income taxes are used in smal l 
countr ies (Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland) as well as large 
federat ions, and are relatively simple to implement. 
Devolving personal income taxation - a recipe for 
over-taxation? 
The issue of whether devolved regional government can 
lead to an excessive burden of taxat ion is an impor tant 
issue. It is also one that featured prominently in the 
Scott ish referendum campaign which led to devolut ion, 
despi te the l imited range of tax-varying powers planned for 
Holyrood. 
A recent comparison of taxat ion in federal and non-federal 
states has shown that , in general, there is no evidence that 
income taxat ion is higher in federal s tates where both 
nat ional and sub-national (state/regional) government co-
occupy the same tax base than in non-federal states. But 
perhaps this is not surprising, given that the countr ies 
concerned include the USA and Switzer land. 
From the viewpoint of economic theory, regional govern-
ments will be l imited in the extent to which they can 
increase personal income taxat ion because of the mobil i ty 
of the tax base. Tax compet i t ion between regions in federa-
t ions has always ensured that no single regional govern-
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ment can steadi ly increase the burden of taxat ion. In the 
Scott ish context we have already seen how some polit ical 
part ies have been keen to commi t not to use the devolved 
tax powers in the foreseeable future. Whilst some tax 
dif ferent ials are bound to arise in a ful ly devolved UK 
system with regional taxes, these di f ferent ials are likely to 
be smal l because of tax compet i t ion. 
Paradoxically, a more serious problem for the regional tax 
authori t ies is an increase in national taxat ion. If there are 
increases in nat ional income taxes, regional governments 
face the strategic problem of whether to hold their addi-
t ional taxes at current levels. If they are concerned that this 
will take tax rates to a point where outward migration rates 
are increased, the regional government 's ability to deter-
mine its own tax revenue yield will be af fected. These 
strategic interact ions between nat ional and sub-national 
governments co-occupying the same tax base are known as 
vert ical tax external i t ies, and l imit the effective degree of 
f iscal autonomy granted to the regions. 
Another impor tan t issue is whether regions should have any 
say in determin ing the progressivity of the taxation system, 
i.e. whether they should be able to have some say not only 
in sett ing the basic rate of income tax, but the whole 
structure of personal income tax rates. Generally th is 
lat i tude is al lowed to sub-national governments in federa-
t ions (e.g. t he USA, Switzerland). Other countr ies which 
have adopted local income taxation often impose str ict 
l imits on the act ions of the sub-national governments. For 
instance, in Denmark sub-national authori t ies can only 
impose a f lat-rate tax which is addit ional to national 
marginal tax rates, and avoids intense tax compet i t ion 
between geographical ly small units. These flat-rate piggy-
back income taxes are set in such a way as to achieve a 
balanced budget. Another issue which must be confronted 
is the administ rat ive cost of al lowing very dif ferent regional 
personal income tax systems to run side-by-side: th is tends 
to reduce the economies of scale of having a national tax 
assessment and col lect ion system. Having said th is , in 
Switzerland, very di f ferent Cantonal tax system do seem to 
coexist. 
Should tax-sharing include natural resource (oil 
and gas) taxation? 
A key issue in the UK debate on devolut ion is what should 
happen to taxes on natural resources. Very few countr ies 
devolve taxat ion on natural resources. Those who do are 
generally federat ions (USA, Canada), and they have done so 
for historical reasons, as royalties and levies were t radi t ion-
ally under the control of the states and provinces. In the 
1970s, natural resource taxat ion has become a real issue 
in these countr ies, as resource-rich provinces and states 
began to wi tness a massive rise in their f iscal capacity. 
However, devolving natural resource taxes also creates 
problems. In Canada, the province of Alberta in Canada 
buil t up a 'heritage saving t rust ' with oil revenues, but its 
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relat ions wi th other provinces in Canada were soured as it 
p laced Canada's f iscal equal isat ion system under pressure. 
In the USA, relat ions between Louisiana and energy-using 
s tates were soured by the imposi t ion by Louisiana of a f i rst-
use tax together wi th an exempt ion system for local Louisi-
ana producers. 
Taxation of oil has long been central to the debate on 
Scott ish devolut ion and independence. Would it make 
sense for the UK to fol low the example of federa l s tates and 
devolve natural resource taxat ion? 
The answer is probably no, for three reasons. The f i rs t is 
tha t the complet ion of the devolut ion se t t lement in the UK 
wil l possibly need to include some e lement of f iscal equal i -
sat ion for the regions. Devolving tax revenues wi l l , as in the 
case of Canada, impose s t ra ins on the f iscal equal isat ion 
system. Specif ical ly, oil tax revenues f luctuate over t ime, 
and are sensit ive to the current and expected fu ture oil 
price. Large f luc tuat ions in the f iscal capacity of the UK 
regions will not be easy to handle in a f iscal equal isat ion 
system which is designed to smooth out t rends in relative 
f iscal capacity. Second, in the case of the UK the dist r ibu-
t ion of natural resources is very uneven, more than in the 
USA. Again th is argues against the ass ignment of natural 
resource taxes to sub-nat ional levels. Devolving petro leum 
revenues will require a considerable interregional adjust-
ment th rough a f iscal equal isat ion system which wil l d is tor t 
local taxat ion and expendi ture decis ions. 
The th i rd reason is tha t UK oil and gas tax revenues are 
likely to shr ink considerably over t ime, and devolut ion at 
th is stage wil l compl icate t he tax ass ignment and equal isa-
t ion ar rangements . The UK's oil and gas taxat ion comes 
f rom four sources: petro leum revenue tax, corporat ion tax, 
royalt ies, and l icence fees. Of these, petro leum revenue tax 
has t radi t ional ly been the biggest source of revenue f rom 
oil and gas. The tax yield on upstream act iv i t ies has varied 
considerably in the 1 9 9 0 s , and has recently risen again, 
a l though a much smal ler proport ion now derives f rom 
petro leum revenue tax (PRT), royalties and l icences (respec-
tively about £ 1 bi l l ion and £ 2 5 0 mil l ion in 1999-00) . 
Corporat ion tax on upst ream act ivi t ies now takes up a 
much bigger share (about £ 1 . 3 bil l ion in 1999-00) . On the 
assumpt ion t ha t by 'devolv ing oil taxes' we imply only PRT 
and royal t ies/ fees, th is would only include a sum dest ined 
to decl ine through t ime. PRT revenues have varied markedly 
in the 1 9 9 0 s , and are dest ined to fal l fur ther . One major 
problem is tha t , a l though t h e oil industry predicts cont inued 
product ion for another decade at current levels, there wil l 
eventual ly be considerable decommiss ion ing costs. These 
are est imated at about £ 8 . 5 bi l l ion and most of these 
expendi tures wil l be al lowable for tax purposes: even 
though current PRT revenue f lows seem healthy, they pale 
into insigni f icance when these decommiss ion ing costs are 
taken into account . Kemp and Stephen (2001) es t imate, 
under a variety of scenar ios for the oil price, tha t f rom 
2 0 1 8 - 2 0 2 5 aggregate PRT relief will exceed PRT payable 
and in some years reaches £ 1 0 0 mil l ion per year even at a 
price of $ 2 0 - 2 8 per barrel. 
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For all these reasons, it seems sensible not to devolve 
natural resource taxat ion in the UK, and part icularly oil and 
gas taxat ion. 
Fiscal equalisation 
If the UK adopts regional fiscal autonomy or tax-sharing it 
will have to confront the problem of redistributing revenues 
between richer and poorer regions. Such schemes have a 
long tradition in some countries (e.g. Germany, Australia, 
Canada, Switzerland), and have recently been introduced in 
others to with increasing devolution (e.g. Italy). Those 
countries that do not have such systems of 'interregional 
solidarity' use central government grants (based on social 
need) to perform this task. Imagine a future system of 
devolved government in the UK which is extended to the 
English regions. There will be wide disparities in the tax 
generating capacities of Scotland, Wales, and the North of 
England compared to the South of England. Some central 
grant allocation based on social criteria or a scheme of tax 
revenue redistribution between poorer and richer regions 
will be needed. 
Measuring need on a regional basis 
If central government grants remain a major part of UK 
regional budgets (for instance as part of a regional equali-
sat ion system), these should be based on specif ic cr i ter ia. 
Most other countr ies have moved away f rom historic 
al locat ions (such as Barnett) towards formula-based grants 
which explicit ly recognise local needs. Japan, Spain and the 
Nordic Countries all base their regional spending al loca-
t ions on measurable criteria which reflect geographic 
disadvantage (populat ion dispersion, degree of urbanisa-
t ion , cl imate), social inequali ty (relative poverty, housing 
quality), and the demand for public services such as health 
and educat ion (demographic characterist ics). 
In Japan, for instance, 24 di f ferent types of public services 
are def ined, uni t costs of provision are calculated, and 
modi f icat ion coeff ic ients are appl ied to take account of the 
needs of each locality. The modif icat ion coeff ic ient, which 
al locates more to needy regions, wil l include factors such 
as density of populat ion, c l imate, rapid populat ion growth, 
and f inancia l capacity. In Spain, a revenue-sharing system 
has been in operat ion since 1 9 9 6 . This was designed to 
al low regional governments to f inance a level of public 
services simi lar to tha t which appl ied prior to the new 
Spanish devolut ion arrangements. In decid ing the shares, 
weights are given to indicators such as populat ion, relative 
poverty, insularity, populat ion dispers ion, and geographical 
size. In Denmark, social criteria such as single parenthood, 
quali ty of housing, unemployment, and ageing populat ion 
are used to determine al locat ions. 
If fu ture UK governments are serious about pursuing a 
social jus t ice agenda it is essential to match spending 
al locat ions to measured regional needs. Clearly one should 
not embark on producing an al location system which 
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prol i ferates the number of indicators, and results in a 
formula that is so complex as to be poorly understood. 
Other countr ies have not been immune f rom the cr i t ic ism 
that , by using a myriad of criteria to measure spending 
needs, the al locat ion of government spending is obscured. 
However, it is di f f icul t to counter the argument tha t some 
objectivity in measur ing regional needs would be preferable 
to none. The UK, as far as al locat ing its grants to the 
devolved assembl ies is concerned, is out on a l imb. 
Conclusion 
The current devolution arrangements in the UK have a 
limited shelf life. Some politicians and pundits have 
recently commented that these discussions are 'purely 
academic' or 'ahead of their time'. This is remarkably 
shortsighted. Until recently, the UK distinguished itself from 
other countries by its emphasis on centralisation and tight 
control on local government. Since 1992 we have finally 
seen some important changes, with greater trust and 
responsibility being placed in devolved government and 
local democracy. But the UK devolution project still has 
serious flaws. Academics have a duty to point these out 
and to propose possible solutions. These issues will soon 
be centre-stage in the political arena, and it would be best 
not to dismiss them. 
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Endnotes 
1 For a detailed analysis of the history of the Barnett 
formula, see Twigger (1998), Bell et a/. (1996). The 
Barnett formula was revised in 1992 by the then Chief 
Secretary of the Treasury Michael Portillo. He modified 
the formula so that Scotland received a smaller share 
(10.66%) of changes in programmes other than Law 
and Order, compared to 11.76% under the original 
Barnett formula. This was to reflect Scotland's falling 
share of the UK population. The share of changes in 
expenditure is sometimes referred to as the Barnett-
Portillo factor. 
2 Assuming a rigorous application of the formula, and a 
growth in UK nominal government spending of about 
5%. A lower rate of nominal public spending growth will 
delay the adjustment (see Bell et a/., 1996, Bell, 2001). 
Another complication is the impact of different rates of 
population growth in Scotland (and Wales) relative to 
England: Cuthbert (2001) shows that a more rapid 
growth rate in population in England can offset the 
effects of the squeeze, if combined with a low rate of 
growth in public spending (given a constant Barnett-
Portillo factor). 
3 This has led some commentators (e.g. Midwinter, 
2000) to support the continuance of the Barnett 
formula as convergence has been negligible in the 
1990s. However, as pointed out by Cuthbert and 
Cuthbert (2001), the offset in convergence in the 
1990s is probably attributable to once-and-for-all 
effects such as faster relative population growth in 
England and increased spending outside the formula. 
4 Indeed, matters are made worse in the UK by the 
complexity of the Barnett formula, and the fact that 
some UK spending decisions by-pass it. This makes it 
very difficult for the average voter to discriminate 
between different policy platforms in Scotland because 
each politician has an incentive to obfuscate the issue 
of affordability in promoting spending decisions. The 
political economy of devolved government may also be 
made more complex by the fact that if different parties 
hold power in Westminster and in the devolved authori-
ties the incentives to bypass the Barnett formula will be 
less than if the same political party holds power in 
both. 
5 See Keen (1997). 
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6 Although some degree of horizontal equalisation of tax 
capacity is undertaken - see below. 
7 For an outline of the Lousiana v Maryland case which 
led to a ruling by the US Supreme Court, see McClure 
and Mieszkowski (1983). 
8 See Ter-Minassian (1997). 
9 See the National Audit Office (2000) report on PRT. 
10 See National Audit Office (2000). 
11 If decommissioning is incurred at the end of a field's 
life, it can be used to offset profits made earlier in time 
in the field. Where it exceeds these profits it can be 
used to offset profits made in other fields. 
12 In the UK the only needs assessment of England and 
the three devolved authorities was conducted in 1979 
(see Bell et a/, 1996). The Treasury study concluded 
that, in order to provide the same level of service as in 
England, spending per capita in Scotland would need to 
be 16% higher than in England. In Wales and Northern 
Ireland the assessment was that spending per capita 
would need to be 9% and 31% higher than in England. 
Tablel: fiscal devolution - a comparison of various OECD countries 
USA 
Canada 
Australia 
Japan 
Germany 
Italy 
Degree of 
fiscal 
Autonomy1 
82.0% 
46.0% 
61.0% 
42.9% 
56.1% 
51.9% 
Tax 
Sharing 
No 
Partial 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Spain 61.4% 
Switzerland 73.0% 
Denmark 72.2% 
Norway 52.2% 
UK 13.1% 
Yes 
Partial 
Partial 
Yes 
No 
Main types of taxes raised at local or regional/state level 
Most States rely on own personal income, corporate income and 
sales taxes. 
Provinces relay mainly on personal income, corporate income 
retail sales and natural resource taxes. 
States rely mainly on taxes on goods and services, payroll, 
property and public enterprise surpluses. 
Local taxes mainly on inhabitants, enterprises and property. 
Local/regionalauthorities have little power to vary rates. 
States mainly rely on tax-sharing with Federal government. 
Wide range of regional/local taxes including: health, petrol, vehicle 
registration, business value added, personal income surcharge, and 
property taxes. 
Regions depend mainly on tax sharing and property and motor taxes. 
Basque Country and Navarra enjoy greater autonomy. 
Cantons levy taxes on personal income, and motor vehicles. 
Mainly local income taxation using flat rate tax. 
Mainly tax sharing. 
Property taxes at local level; Scotland has limited powers to vary basic 
rate of income tax. 
Central 
Government 
grants to 
devolved authorities 
based on special 
regional needs 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Redistribution 
between poorer 
and richer 
regions to 
help equalise 
tax capacity 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes Partial 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Partial 
Yes 
No 
No No 
Notes: 
Reliance by devolved authorities (regional and local) on local taxation revenue plus tax sharing relative to central government grants for expenditure plans (expressed 
as percentage of spending financed out of regional and local taxes). 
Data refers to various years (1993-98). Source of data: OECD, IMF, various publications. 
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